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In a recent paper, Bernanke and Parkinson (1991) studied interwar U.S. manufacturing data
with the objective of assessing competing theories of the business cycle. An important finding
was that short-run increasing returns to Labor (SRIRL), or procyclical labor productivity, was at
least as strong during the Great Depression as in the postwar period. The authors conclude that
this information casts further doubt on the real business cycle explanation of economic
fluctuations.
The purpose of this note is to point out that, within the data set analyzed by Bernanke and
Parkinson (20% of the manufacturing sector), labor productivity during the Great Depression
(1928:111 to 1933:1) was procyclical in some industries and countercyclical in others.
Furthermore, our measure of labor productivity for the entire manufacturing sector during this
period was countercyclical. We conclude that the evidence is not favorable toward the hypothesis
that large, negative aggregate demand shocks pushed the 1929-33 economy down a static,
neoclassical production function. Another possibility is that firms which typically hoarded labor
during recessions chose not to do so during the 1929-33 period.
Michael D. Bordo Charles L. Evans
Department of Economics Research Department
Rutgers University Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
New Brunswick, NJ 08903 P.O. Box 834
and NEER Chicago, IL 60690In a recent paper, Bernanke and Parkinson (1991) studied interwar U.S. manufacturing
data with the objective of assessing competing theories of the business cycle. An important
finding was that short-run increasing returns to labor (SRIRL), or procyclical labor productivity.
was at least as strong during the Great Depression as in the postwar period. The authors
conclude that this information casts further doubt on the real business cycle explanation of
economic fluctuations. Their argument can be summarized as follows. Suppose that the Great
Depression was not caused by a series of technology shocks; instead, suppose that the cause was
a series of aggregate demand shocks. This is a plausible identifying assumption. In this situation,
a refutable implication of many neoclassical models with static production technologies is that
labor productivity should be countercyclical.' A finding of procyclical labor productivity during
this period is problematic for these theories. As Bernanke and Parkinson describe the
implications of their analysis, "this [procyclical labor productivity] constitutes a strong rejection
of the technological shock theory of SRJRL and, consequently, of the real business cycle
approach [p. 441]." This leaves theories of labor hoarding and increasing returns as the prime
remaining candidates.2
'For example, Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) find the introduction of stochastic
government purchases shocks leads to countercyclical labor productivity (in the absence of
technology shocks).
2A theoretical difficulty with this line of argument is that labor hoarding and increasing
returns can be accomodated within equilibrium models of the business cycle, as in Burnside,
Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (1993) and Braun and Evans (1991). In each of these models, the
researchers study a demand shock which leads to procyclical productivity. Presumably, the
evidence against the real business cycle approach refers to models of the type popularized by
Kydland and Prescott (1982), Prescott (1986), Hansen (1985), and Christiano and Eichenbaum
(1992); explicit mention is also made to Lucas and Rapping (1969).
2The purpose of this note is to point out that, within the data set analyzed by Bernanke and
Parkinson (20% of the Manufacturing sector), labor productivity during the Great Depression
(1929:ffl to 1933:1) was procyclical in some industries and countercyclical in others.
Furthermore, our measure of labor productivity for the entire manufacturing sector during this
period was countercycical. We conclude that the evidence is not unfavorable toward the
hypothesis that large, negative aggregate demand shocks pushed the 1929-33 economy down a
static, neoclassical production function. Another possibility is that firms which typically hoarded
labor during recessions chose not to do so during the 1929-33 period.
While labor hoarding is likely to be an important factor in explaining procycical labor
productivity during relatively brief economic downturns, it is less likely to be important during
deep and prolonged reductions in economic activity. Labor hoarding during a recession is often
defined as a firm holding excess labor' temporarily until the economy rebounds, in an effort to
mitigate the costs of adjusting employment rapidly in both directions.3 While this phenomena
seems imminently plausible for postwar recessions, the length and severity of the Great
Depression (1929-33) suggests that the costs of adjusting employment and honoring implicit long-
term employment contracts were second-order relative to the losses that many firms and
industries experienced. If this was the case, labor hoarding mechanisms would merely mitigate
the countercyclical effects on productivity, not eliminate them. Thus, a finding that labor
productivity was countercycical during this brief period need not refute the hypothesis that firms
tended to hoard labor at other times during the interwar period.
3The term 'excess labor' is relative to some target level of employment which the firm would
desire in the absence of adjustment costs. Textbook definitions of labor hoarding can be found
in Dornbusch and Fischer (1987, pp 478-479) and Hall and Taylor (1991, p. 96).
3Increasing returns theories can generate a positive correlation between output and labor
productivity [n response o aggregate demand shocks, but the initial response will not necessarily
be procyclical. For example, suppose that the production function is Cobb-Douglas, the factors
of production are labor and capital, and that within a period the capital stock is fixed. Then, if
the production function is concave with respect to the labor input, a negative demand shock
which reduces labor and output will lead to an increase in labor productivity (countercyclical).
However, if the increasing returns are sufficiently large, so that the production function is not
concave in labor, then productivity will fall (procyclical). Therefore, a finding of procyclical
labor productivity during the 1929-33 period is more likely to be a strong indication of increasing
returns rather than labor hoarding.
Firms' behavior during the period 1929-33 is critical because the identifying assumption
that technology shocks did not cause the Great Depression is a statement about 1929-33, not pre-
1929 and probably not post-1933. Our method of assessing the cycicality of labor productivity
differs from the analysis in Bemanke and Parkinson. Bernanke and Parkinson infer that labor
productivity is procycical from production function estimates. Assuming a Cobb-Douglas
production function, they estimate the following equation:
A =0An,+
whereAy and An are the growth rates of output and labor hours, c, is an error term, and a
constant term has been suppressed. Table 1 reports Bernanke and Parkinson's Ordinary Least
Squares estimates of 0 for eight manufacturing industries which collectively account for 20% of
4total manufacturing during this period (from their Table 2, column 1, p. 447)4 Under the
identifying assumption that technology shocks are approximately negligible during this period.
the procyclicality of labor productivity can be inferred from the estimates of 0: 8>1 implies
productivity is positively correlated with labor hours (and output), 0<1 implies countercyclical
productivity. Using this method of analysis, over the period 1929-39, six of the eight industries
exhibited procyclical productivity (Petroleum and Leather exhibited countercyclical productivity).
Computing the correlation between output and labor productivity provides a more direct
perspective on these data's comovements. Alternative definitions of trend and cycle are easily
accomodated and a simple assessment of the immediate period of interest (1929-33) is facilitated.
To compute the correlations, the output and labor productivity data are detrended. Our
detrending procedures place more weight on business cycle frequency movements than Bernanke
and Parkinson. Their use of the first-difference filter tends to place more weight on high
frequency movements in the data. We detrended the logarithms of output and average labor
productivity data5 using either the Hodrick-Prescott filter or a linear deterministic trend.6 Both
filters place more weight on lower, business-cycle frequency movements than the first difference
4As Bemanke and Parkinson report, their results are not sensitive to whether 0 is estimated
by OLS or Instrumental Variables, nor whether or not the growth rate of capital is included in
the production function. Two other industries studied by Bernanke and Parkinson (Stone-Clay-
Glass and Nonferrous metals) are omitted from our study since the data do not cover the period
of interest, 1929-33.
5The original Bernanke-Parkinson data are seasonally unadjusted. We seasonally adjusted
the output and labor productivity data using the RATS implementation of the Census X- 11 filter
(EZ-Xl 1).
6For many series, the Hodrick-Prescott trend series turns down during the Great Depression.
The linear trend does not. The correlations across each filter are quite similiar, indicating that
the Hodrick-Prescott filter per se is not the reason for these results.
5filter. Computing standard errors for these correlations requires taking into account the serial
correlation properties of the error terms which are implicit in these calculations.7 Table 1 reports
the contemporaneous correlations and standard errors for three sample periods: 1924-1939, 1929-
1939, and 1929:3-1933:1. In addition to the eight industries which account for only 20% of
manufacturing, we also have examined data for total manufacturing.8 First, notice that for the
periods 1924-39 and 1929-39, the HP filter correlations agree qualitatively with the correlations
implied by Bernanke and Parkinson's OLS estimates:six of the eight industries exhibit
substantial procyclical productivity, with Petroleum and Leather being either acyclical (1924-39)
or countercyclical (1929-39). Second, during the Great Depression four of the eight industries
exhibited countercyclical labor productivity: .Petroleum,Leather, Rubber, and Paper/Pulp. For
our measure of the total manufacturing sector, labor productivity was also countercyclical. Third,
despite the small number of observations for this period, the estimated standard errors indicate
that labor productivity was significantly countercyclical in the Petroleum, Leather, Paper/Pulp,
and total Manufacturing sectors. For the Rubber industry, the hypothesis of acyclicality cannot
7The estimator of the correlation is a just-identified 0MM estimator. The error term in the
0MM estimation which identifies the correlation p is given by ,where
y and x are the output and labor productivity data. The parameters p, p,, o, andare
estimated simultaneously with p: p, and p are the means of y and x; a and ,arethe standard
deviations of y and x. The instrument used to identify p in the w equation is unity. Standard
errors are estimated with a Newey-West covariance estimator with four lags.
8The output data are industrial production from the Federal Reserve, and labor hours are from
BLS (employment) and the MCB (average hours worked per week). Bernanke and Parkinson
choose not to consider the total manufacturing data: their choice is motivated by an attempt to
avoid aggregation bias and those industries whose production indices are based on scaled-up
input measures (p. 4.44-445). If the measured manufacturing output is simply proportional to the
labor input plus a measurement error term, then our estimated output-labor productivity
correlation will be biased upward. In this situation, the bias would make it more difficult to find
evidence of countercyclical productivity.
6be rejected. For each of these five industiy definitions, the degree of countercyclicality during
this period appears to be greater than during the longer period of 1929-39. Recall that Bernanke
and Parkinson concluded that labor productivity was at least as procyclical during this period as
the postwar period.
Figures 1 and 2 display the cyclical behavior of output and labor productivity for each
of the nine industrial sectors. Figures 1 and 2 display time series of output and labor productivity
which have been detrended with the Hodrick-Prescott and linear filters, respectively. The shaded
regions correspond to recessions as dated by the National Bureau of Economic Research. During
the 1929-33 period, productivity is clearly countercyclical in the Petroleum, Leather, Paper/Pulp,
Manufacturing, and (to a lesser extent) Rubber sectors. Productivity is below trend at or shortly
after the business cycle peak in the third quarter of 1929. In each of these sectors, as output falls
productivity rises above trend during this period. For these sectors the cyclical behavior of
productivity is strikingly similar across the two detrending filters.
To examine the relative cycicality of labor productivity in the subperiod 1929:3-1933:1
versus the full sample period 1924-39, we conducted a Chow test. The null hypothesis is that
the output-labor productivity is the same over the entire sample 1924-39 versus the alternative
hypothesis that the correlation during 1929:3-1933:1 differs from the correlation in 1924:1 -1929:2
and 1933:2-1939:4 periods.9 The final column of the table reports the marginal significance level
9For this test the error term in the GMM estimation which identifies the correlation(s) is
given by w=[(y where d1 is a dummyvariable which takes on the value
1 during the period 1929:3 to 1933:1 and zero otherwise. The instruments used to identify p
and P2 are unity and the dummy variable d. The parameters p, p, a, and a are estimated
simultaneously with p and p2. Under the null hypothesis that the correlations are equal across
both sample periods, P2=0 This is the Chow test.
7for rejecting the hypothesis that the correlations are equal during the period 1929-33 and the
period 1924-39 (excluding 1929-33). The interesting cases are the five industries which appear
to exhibit countercyclical productivity during the Great Depression period. For Petroleum.
Paper/Pulp, and total Manufacturing, the null hypothesis of equal cyclicality can be rejected for
both detrending filters at marginal significance levels ranging from 10% to 1%. For Leather the
null hypothesis cannot be rejected: since the full sample correlation was negative, this indicates
that labor productivity was equally countercyclical across the interwar period. For Rubber, the
null hypothesis cannot be rejected, but the question remains as to whether this correlation is
positive or negative. The evidence for the Rubber industry seems to indicate acyclical labor
productivity.
Other studies of this period provide corroborating evidence on the countercyclicality of
labor productivity during the Great Depression. First, according to Margo (1993), real wages
rose 16% from 1929-32. This would suggest that firms are moving up their marginal product
of labor schedule and average productivity is rising (for a Cobb-Douglas technology). In arguing
that the data are not collected in a way which is consistent with a homogeneous labor market,
Margo notes that less productive workers with lower wages were laid off first. This observation
alone, if true, would indicate that measured productivity was rising during this period. Second.
Bemanke and Powell (1986) studied eight industrial labor markets during the interwar period and
found that labor productivity at the trough (1933:1) was higher than at the peak (1929:3) for three
of the five industry definitions considered in Table 1: Paper, Leather, and Lumber (Bemanke-
Powell, Table 10.13, p. 615). A fourth industry, Petroleum, was not covered in the Bernanke and
Powell study. For the fifth industry definition, total manufacturing, labor productivity was lower
8at the trough than the peak, but its behavior during that period was not detailed. On balance,
these studies tend to support our findings.
A finding that labor productivity was countercyclical during the period 1929-33 should
not be viewed as surprising even if firms tended to hoard labor periodically during the period of
1924-39. In response to a large and persistent demand shock, firms may be quite willing to incur
the costs of adjusting their workforce. In this case, the implications of a labor hoarding model
may not be too different from a more standard neoclassical model. On the other hand, if
increasing returns is an important factor in generating procyclical productivity from aggregate
demand shocks in general, the countercylicality in total manufacturing is surprising. The
practical significance of these findings is that researchers wishing to account for this turbulent
period in the context of a dynamic economic model may find it useful to initially explore
standard neoclassical production structures, and focus on the source of the demand and supply
shocks.
9Table I
Correlations of Output and Labor Productivity
Bemanke-Parkinson Data. Seasonally Adjusted (Census X-l 1)
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